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2
A Definition of Faith
The main argument of the book: faith helps us achieve the internal goods of research science, social/political reform, and parenting, and these 
practices are very important to good living; therefore faith is an important 
virtue for good living. Chapter 1 de"ned “virtue” as it functions in this argu-
ment; the next step is to de"ne “faith.”
Easier said than done. Asking, “What is faith?” is much like asking, 
“What is a game?”
#e philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote that questions such as 
“What is ______?” o$en lead us astray.1 We think that there must be some 
thing that corresponds to our word. #e word may be meaning, or time, or 
faith, or something else entirely. But there may not be any one thing named 
by that particular word. Wittgenstein famously o%ered the example of 
games. If we pay attention, he wrote, we will see that there is no single com-
mon feature to games, but instead there are many “family resemblances” 
among games. We discover this, not by meditating on the word game, but 
by looking. #at is, we pay attention to the way people actually use the word. 
I propose we do this with faith.
People use faith in a variety of ways. I will list eight di%erent meanings 
people assign to faith. #e list is not exhaustive; people undoubtedly use 
faith in more ways than these. But the list demonstrates, I think, that there 
is no single meaning of faith, and no single common feature to these usages. 
#e eighth de"nition is my own proposal. I do not say it is the true or best 
understanding of the term; there is no single true or best understanding 
1. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, sections 65 and 66, and Blue Book, 1.
of the term. I o%er my de"nition of faith because it serves the purposes of 
the argument of the book and because it captures an important way many 
people use the word.
Because people use faith to mean di%erent things, they o$en talk past 
each other when they discuss faith. I say faith is a virtue, but someone else 
says it is a vice. If we recognize that we may mean di%erent things by faith, 
we’re much more likely to understand each other. 
It’s possible that at some point readers of this chapter will think, “Well, 
that’s not what I mean by ‘faith,’” as we go along. #at’s all right. I am go-
ing to o%er a de"nition of faith, not the de"nition of faith. Perhaps when 
you use the word you are talking about something other than what I call 
faith, and perhaps the thing you mean by “faith” is something worthy of a 
separate discussion. #e argument of this book only asks that you consider 
my contention that the human characteristic that I will call “faith” is a vital 
part of good living.
Having acknowledged that people mean di%erent things by “faith,” I 
do think that the understanding of faith developed in this chapter (which I 
will call faith(8)) tracks important features of the way both religious and non-
religious people speak of faith. I hope that the de"nition of faith I propose 
will be neutral in this sense: both those philosophers who think faith is a 
virtue and those who think it is a vice will agree that the de"nition describes 
an important concept that can rightfully be called “faith.”
A$er I survey eight versions of faith, I will re"ne faith(8) by using some 
features of the earlier versions to enrich the concept in faith(8). In section 2.2 
I will discuss the a%ective and volitional component of faith, and in section 
2.3 I will defend my contention that faith must have a cognitive component.
2.1 VARIETIES OF “FAITH”
On to the list!
Faith(1): “Faith is believing what you know ain’t so.” Samuel Clemens 
(Mark Twain) put this memorable phrase in the mouth of one of his charac-
ters, Pudd’nhead Wilson. It’s a joke, of course, but the joke has a certain bite 
because we recognize some truth in it. #at is, some people seem to a+rm, 
by “faith,” things that they know, or ought to know, are false. Charles Dodg-
son (Lewis Carroll) o%ered a similar joke, in !rough the Looking Glass. 
Alice says to the White Queen: “#ere’s no use in trying. One can’t believe 
impossible things.” #e White Queen answers: “I daresay you haven’t had 
much practice. When I was your age, I always did it for half-an-hour a 
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day. Why, sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before 
breakfast.”2
I imagine that Mark Twain and Lewis Carroll aimed their ridicule at 
real targets. #at is, they knew people who used “faith” like Pudd’nhead 
Wilson. Some people really have thought that faith means believing impos-
sible things or believing something one knows to be false. 
Having admitted that some people speak this way, we need to see that 
they shouldn’t. People who think faith involves believing things known to 
be false are wrong, "rst of all, about belief. If I believe a thing, I must think 
that it is true. #is is what philosophers call an “analytic truth.” One need 
not interview bachelors to con"rm that they are unmarried men; we know 
this simply by knowing what “bachelor” means. In a similar way, the con-
cept of belief includes the concept of regarding as true. To say, “I believe 
this, but it’s not true,” is as unintelligible as saying, “I am a bachelor, and that 
woman is my wife.”
If faith(1) were the only version of faith in our language, I would be the 
"rst to agree that faith is an intellectual vice. My contention that faith is a 
virtue clearly does not extend to all uses of “faith.”
Faith(2): faith is believing without doubts. #e notion here is that faith 
and doubt are inversely proportional to each other. On this view, the degree 
that a person has doubt about something is the degree of her disbelief in it. 
Some Christians interpret certain biblical passages as supporting this view; 
for instance, Jesus chastised Peter when the disciple failed to walk on water: 
“You of little faith, why did you doubt?” (Matthew 14:31). Whether or not 
this passage really means that doubt and faith are antithetical, it is certain 
that some people read it that way.
If people have imbibed the notion that faith is opposed to doubt, and if 
they think that faith is a good thing, it is easy for them to develop an unwill-
ingness to consider evidence against their faith. Such reluctance to consider 
counter-evidence comes in degrees. Some people may be merely hesitant 
to consider counter-evidence, while others may energetically avoid it. In 
extreme cases, some people deny that there is any possible counter-evidence 
to their beliefs. Peter Boghossian, a philosopher at Portland State University, 
identi"es such unfalsi"able beliefs as “cognitive sickness.”3
Since the reluctance to consider counter-evidence comes in degrees, 
we should be slow to make a blanket judgment about all cases of faith(2). A 
2. Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland & !rough the Looking Glass, 
174.
3. Boghossian, “Faith, Belief and Hope.” It is possible that professor Boghossian 
would include other “faiths” from my list as cognitive sicknesses, but he would certainly 
include unfalsi"able beliefs.
completely unfalsi"able belief—that is, a belief against which the believer 
will allow no possible evidence of any kind—is a bad belief. Boghossian is 
right about that. But a person may be slow to consider counter-evidence for 
a belief for good, practical reasons. It might be true that the extreme case is 
a “cognitive sickness” while the mild case is a cognitive virtue. For example, 
teammates in basketball generally believe that each member of the team 
is striving for team goals (primarily, winning). Suppose it occurs to player 
L (for loyal) that one of her teammates, S (for sel"sh) might be pursuing 
individual glory rather than team success. In most cases, good teammates 
simply dismiss this worry out-of-hand. Loyal player L doesn’t bother to 
weigh evidence for or against the belief, because wasting mental e%ort on 
such questions distracts from the immediate task of playing well together as 
a team. In this case, player L’s mild reluctance to consider counter-evidence 
is actually a good thing. But suppose overwhelming evidence comes to light 
that player S is not only pursuing her own interests over the team’s goals, 
she has been deliberately “throwing” games to pay o% debts to a bookmaker. 
Player S is both self-serving and a cheater. Now suppose loyal L’s faith in 
sel"sh S remains unshaken; player L will not allow anything to weaken her 
belief. When the mild reluctance has become a complete refusal to consider 
counter-evidence it has become a bad thing, a “cognitive sickness.”
Faith(3): faith is a special way of acquiring and maintaining beliefs. 
Sometimes one can meet people who say, “I choose to believe . . .” #is 
understanding of faith brings will onto the scene. Faith(3) does not go to the 
extreme of faith(1), since faith(3) does not mean belief in things known to be 
false or logically impossible. Faith(3) restricts the operation of the will to a 
certain class of beliefs.
Philosophers have long debated the propriety of allowing will any role 
in belief formation. W.K. Cli%ord said that it is wrong for anyone, anywhere, 
at any time to believe anything on insu+cient evidence. Since only evidence 
counts, there is no room in the belief business for wishful thinking, hoping, 
or faith. William James replied that there are some forced choice situations 
in which we must either believe something or else not believe it, that in 
some of these situations purely “intellectual grounds” will not decide the 
issue, and that sometimes these forced choices are important enough that 
it is morally acceptable to choose to believe. #at is, James implied, there 
are some situations in which beliefs might be rightly based on something 
other than evidence. Lest we think this debate is a mere artifact of the 1890s, 
when Cli%ord and James wrote, in 2005 Simon Blackburn began his book. 
Truth: A Guide, by rehearsing the Cli%ord and James arguments (and siding 
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emphatically with Cli%ord).4 Faith is clearly a bad thing, says Blackburn. 
“Intellectual grounds” will decide most issues, Blackburn says, and when 
they won’t, we can simply refrain from believing. “Refusing to believe is not 
a kind of faith.”5 For Blackburn, there are no forced choice situations such 
as James imagined.
#e debate between Cli%ord and James focused mostly on religious 
faith, with Cli%ord arguing that religious beliefs, if not founded on good 
evidence, are evil and James claiming that persons may properly believe 
in God by choice. Blackburn sides with Cli%ord, but says that the debate 
about religious beliefs is only an illustration. Faith cannot be admitted as 
a shortcut around evidence in any case. What we want to be true is simply 
irrelevant to what is true, Blackburn insists.
Notice that faith(2) and faith(3) are not co-extensive. A person may hold 
both positions, that faith is inversely proportional to doubt and that faith 
is a special route to achieving beliefs. But nothing about faith(2) requires 
faith(3), or vice versa. Analogous to what Wittgenstein said about games, we 
see family resemblances, not essential features.
Faith(4): faith is not a special way of acquiring beliefs, but is a commit-
ment of one’s life toward one’s beliefs. Faith(4) is well expressed by Arthur 
Holmes:
Faith is neither a way of knowing nor a source of knowledge. 
Faith is rather an openness and wholehearted response to God’s 
self-revelation. It does not preclude thinking either about what 
we believe or about what we are unsure of, nor does it make 
it unnecessary to search for truth or to examine evidence and 
arguments.6
C.S. Lewis’s view paralleled Holmes’s:
Now Faith, in the sense in which I am here using the word, is 
the art of holding on to things your reason has once accepted, 
in spite of your changing moods. For moods will change, what-
ever view your reason takes. I know that by experience. Now 
that I am a Christian I do have moods in which the whole thing 
looks very improbable; but when I was an atheist I had moods 
in which Christianity looked terribly probable.7
4. Blackburn, Truth, 3–13.
5. Ibid., 13.
6. Holmes, !e Idea of a Christian College, 18.
7. Lewis, Mere Christianity, 123.
Faith(4) is clearly incompatible with faith(3). Holmes explicitly and 
Lewis implicitly deny that faith is a special way of acquiring beliefs. Now, 
some Christians think of faith along the lines of faith(3), and in these ex-
cerpts Holmes and Lewis are writing explicitly as Christians. #e obvious 
conclusion to be drawn is that Christians disagree about what “faith” is; at 
the least, they do not completely agree about it. I’m con"dent the same is 
true for Muslims and Jews. #is realization underscores the importance of 
paying attention to various uses of “faith.” It’s not just that believers and 
unbelievers speak past each other when they debate faith; coreligionists 
sometimes speak past each other as well.
For Holmes and Lewis, faith concerns what one does about one’s be-
liefs. Here we can bene"t from a distinction made by medieval theologians. 
#ere are two parts to faith: "des (the thing believed) and "ducia (the at-
titude taken toward the thing believed). For example, Christianity requires 
that one believe ("des) that God was in Christ reconciling the world to Him-
self, but the Christian also commits herself ("ducia) to this belief. #e "du-
cia aspect of faith includes a%ect and volition, feelings and actions. Holmes 
and Lewis insist on the "ducia element of faith; for them, it is the de"ning 
aspect of faith. For both of them, acquiring beliefs is a matter of reason and 
evidence; faith is what you do with beliefs once you’ve got them.
Faith(5): faith is a gi$ of God to believe things necessary for salvation. 
Here, faith is explicitly understood as religious faith, as faith in God and in 
whatever truths are necessary for salvation. #e philosopher Alvin Plant-
inga is a representative of this view, which he "nds in #omas Aquinas and 
John Calvin. Plantinga seems to think of the gi$ of faith as a natural capacity 
“built in” to human nature; he uses Calvin’s phrase sensus divinitatis for this 
semi-perceptual cognitive power. #e idea is that in many ordinary circum-
stances of life, human beings “sense” God. #ey then believe in God, not 
on the basis of an argument, but basically.8 Consider an analogy. Suppose 
someone asks you what you had for breakfast, and you answer, “#e quiche 
looked runny, so I had the omelet.” Your belief that you chose the omelet is 
not based on evidence or reasoning; you simply remember what you had for 
breakfast. #is is a “basic” belief. In appropriate circumstances you just "nd 
yourself believing something. In a similar way, Plantinga argued, persons 
may, in certain circumstances, simply "nd themselves believing things like 
“God made all this beauty,” or “God is displeased with my shabby behavior.” 
In such circumstances, the sensus divinitatis simply informs us.
Another version of faith(5) would see the gi$ of faith as an event in a 
person’s life. On this version, God directly gives a person belief in things 
8. Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” 102–160.
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crucial to salvation.9 Robert T. Herbert quotes a character in Graham 
Greene’s !e End of the A#air: “I’ve caught belief like a disease,” and, “I fell 
into belief like I fell into love.” Herbert’s position is that coming to believe 
is, in at least some cases, neither reasonable nor unreasonable. It is simply 
something that happens to a person. #e occasion of the gi$ might be any 
sort of event in the person’s life: a vision of beauty, a rational argument, 
experience of su%ering, and so on.
Aquinas famously a+rmed that some items of dogma could be dem-
onstrated by argument; for instance, that God exists can be shown by right 
reason. However, some people may not be able to understand the arguments 
that demonstrate these truths. Such simple folk believe by faith—a gi$ of 
God—things that learned people can know through demonstration. But 
Aquinas did not think that all truths of Christianity could be demonstrated 
by reason. For these items of dogma (e.g. that God exists as a trinity), all the 
faithful are dependent on revelation. In any case, we need the gi$ of faith (as 
"ducia) to properly align our lives with the teachings of the church.
Faith(6): two kinds of faith should be distinguished; thin faith is not 
the same thing as thick faith. Jay Wood, a philosopher at Wheaton College, 
de"nes “thin faith” as trust in our basic epistemic faculties.10 “#ick faith,” 
on the other hand, is belief in some comprehensive doctrine, such as some 
particular religion or ideology.
It’s important to take notice of the di%erence between thin faith and 
thick faith, not least because it shows the fallacy of a certain argument o$en 
used against agnosticism. 
Let me illustrate the notion of thin faith. 1) I must trust my senses 
to navigate through a day. 2) I have to believe that the words and phrases 
I use in thinking today are part of the same language I used yesterday. 3) I 
may doubt this or that memory belief, but the only way to correct memory 
beliefs is to check them against other beliefs, including memory beliefs, that 
I am not doubting. 4) If I don’t depend on fundamental logical moves such 
as modus ponens, I can’t reason at all. Sensory beliefs, memory beliefs, and 
dependence on logical inferences are examples of thin faith, and Wood is 
certainly right that we must have thin faith if we are to engage in intellectual 
work.
Sometimes religious people will argue this way: “Everyone needs to 
have some kind of faith, so really it is only a question of which faith one will 
adopt. Disbelief in God is just as much a matter of faith as belief in God.” 
Stated just that baldly, the argument is ambiguous and fallacious. Professor 
9. Herbert, “Is Coming to Believe in God Reasonable or Unreasonable?” 
10. Wood, “Faith’s Intellectual Rewards.” 
Wood’s distinction between thin faith and thick faith helps us see why. It is 
true that everyone must have thin faith, but it is not true that everyone must 
have thick faith. Agnostics are able to engage in intellectual work—precisely 
because they do trust their basic epistemic faculties—while at the same time 
not subscribing to thick religious or ideological faith. 
Atheists, unlike agnostics, seem to take a position on a thick faith 
question. Perhaps atheists think, on the basis of sense perception, memory 
or logic, that the existence of God can be disproved. If that were true, their 
disbelief in God would be knowledge and not faith. But if there is no such 
proof, their disbelief in God really is just as much a matter of faith as reli-
gious persons’ belief in God. In contrast, the agnostic’s "ducia faith in her 
epistemic faculties does not commit her to any religious position.
Faith(7): faith is the trust we place in subsidiary knowledge while we 
strive for focal knowledge; at the same time, faith is trust that the focal 
knowledge we strive for is attainable. #e terms “subsidiary knowledge” and 
“focal knowledge” are derived from the work of Michael Polanyi.11
Polanyi’s epistemology represents a radical break from most Western 
epistemology, from Plato to Plantinga.12 To appreciate the depth of Polanyi’s 
rebellion, we need to consider (brie1y) what the Western tradition has said. 
Philosophers have assumed throughout our history that we must "rst 
understand what knowledge is before we can "gure out how to get it. What 
is knowledge? What is the di%erence between mere opinion and knowl-
edge? #ese and like questions have dominated more than two millennia 
of epistemology. 
Knowledge is justi"ed true belief, someone might say, a view o$en at-
tributed to Plato. #at is, for something to be knowledge, you have to be-
lieve it, and it has to be true, and you must have good reasons for believing 
it.13 But what reasons count as good reasons for believing something? What 
justi"es holding a belief? 
#omas Aquinas illustrates a historically important answer: founda-
tionalism. Foundationalists hold that most of our beliefs should be deriv-
able from basic beliefs. Beliefs are justi"ed if they are basic beliefs or derived 
from basic beliefs. For “classical” foundationalists like Aquinas, the basic 
beliefs are either self-evident truths or truths that are evident to the senses.14 
11. In this section I depend on the development of Polanyi’s insights in Meek, Lov-
ing to Know. 
12. Meek, “Michael Polanyi and Alvin Plantinga.” 
13. Contemporary epistemologists would not a+rm a JTB theory of knowledge 
without modifying it to account for Gettier problems. See Gettier, “Is Justi"ed True 
Belief Knowledge?”
14. Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God.” Plantinga seems to be a foundationalist, 
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Rene Descartes and David Hume together undermined our con"-
dence in truths evident to the senses. First, Descartes set the standard for 
knowledge at undoubtability. He worried about the possibility that he might 
be dreaming rather than perceiving the real world. In the most extreme 
case, Descartes thought, if it is possible that an evil demon is deceiving me, 
I can’t rely on my perceptions to deliver real knowledge. So the mark of true 
knowledge is that it is impossible to be wrong: undoubtability. Philosophers 
like John Locke cheerfully accepted the undoubtability standard, thinking 
that they could prove the reliability of the senses (and the existence of God 
and lots of other things). But David Hume came along and pointed out that 
all of our perceptual beliefs rely on our prior belief that a real world causes 
our perceptions—and our belief in causation is itself not a self-evident be-
lief, nor a perceptual belief, nor derivable from either self-evident beliefs 
or perceptual beliefs. Hume concluded that belief in causation is akin to 
superstition. And if we don’t have good reason to believe in causation, we 
have no good reason to trust our senses. Hume recognized that we are over-
whelmingly predisposed to believe in causation and the deliverances of our 
senses, but that only means that we should admit that we live in a world 
beyond our capacity to really know.15
Hume’s skeptical conclusion was something of a scandal in its own 
time (Kant certainly thought so), and it has motivated much epistemology 
in the last three centuries. It is embarrassing that in the era of modern sci-
ence some of the best epistemologists say we don’t really know anything. 
Don’t we live in the era of the knowledge explosion? And yet epistemology 
in the last century has not escaped the shadow of Hume. It seems crazy to 
say we don’t know things; we’re learning all the time. But epistemological 
theories seem to multiply like tribbles, mostly in the vain attempt to "nd a 
watertight de"nition of knowledge.
Now we can appreciate the radical nature of Michael Polanyi’s epis-
temology. Polanyi was a Hungarian medical doctor and physical chemist, 
but his interests extended to economics, politics, and philosophy. Polanyi 
thought that the epistemology of the mid-20th century made no sense of 
the way scientists actually work. He started, not with the question, “What is 
knowledge?” but with, “How do we know?” Scientists do gain knowledge—
how do they do it? Polanyi’s epistemology rests on an insightful exploration 
of the process of knowledge acquisition. He steadfastly resists getting side-
tracked by the desire for a de"nition of knowledge.
but not a classical foundationalist; he would include belief in God among basic beliefs. 
15. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Part III, Section XIV.
What happens when we come to know? #ink of knowing as a process 
of discovery. How does the process work? Polanyi thought that his great-
est discovery was the “structure of tacit knowing.” We move from “tacit” 
knowledge or awareness to “focal” knowledge/awareness. Consider learning 
to read.16 When we were children we learned the shapes of letters and the 
sounds they represent. We learned to blend the sounds together to make 
words, and we spoke the words in order to grasp their sense. In Polanyi’s 
terms, we directed our focal awareness to letters, sounds, and words. But 
later, a$er having learned to read, our attention shi$s. Suppose you are 
reading a loan contract for a house. Now, your focal awareness is on the 
contract—an abstract entity, not the paper and ink. You are thinking of the 
responsibilities and obligations you will take on if you sign the contract. 
Notice: while you are reading the contract, you rely on—Polanyi would say 
you indwell—the words and sentences on the paper. You have subsidiary 
awareness of the letters and words; you are probably not conscious of them. 
Your conscious attention is on the matter of focal awareness, the contract.
Esther Meek says the process of coming to know displays faith in two 
ways. First, we trust subsidiary things while we strive to understand the 
focal things. Second, the whole process is motivated and sustained by belief 
that truth is there to be found; the focal understanding we desire can be 
achieved.17
Polanyi pointed out that our subsidiary awareness is tacit rather than 
explicit. A well-trained doctor, when using a probe to explore some organ 
inside a patient relies not on sight (since the organ is inside the patient’s 
body) but on the feel of the probe in her hand. She gains insight into the state 
of the organ by relying on a kind of knowledge that she probably could not 
express verbally. Another illustration: think of keeping your balance while 
riding a bicycle. Many parts of your body may be involved in this complex 
behavior—your arms, legs, inner ear (sense of balance), eyes, your butt on 
the seat, a feeling in your gut. All are included in subsidiary awareness, but 
rarely are you consciously aware of any of them. In fact, says, Polanyi, our 
subsidiary knowledge is indeterminate; it is impossible to say precisely all 
that goes into it. We are embodied knowers. We also exhibit faith, says Meek, 
in our pursuit of focal knowledge. We trust that there is something “out 
there,” something to be known, and we can gain some measure of under-
standing of it. A measure of understanding—but not complete comprehen-
sion! Polanyi and Meek say the mark of the real is that the new insight opens 
16. Meek, Loving to Know, 70.
17. Ibid., 94, 170.
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up new questions.18 #e process of coming to know moves from one kind 
of indeterminacy (not-completely-speci"able subsidiary awareness) to a 
di%erent kind of indeterminacy (a focal insight that opens up unpredicted 
further avenues of exploration).
Faith(7) has a+nities with “thin” faith when it is our reliance on subsid-
iary awareness we have in mind. But faith(7) also coheres with other versions 
of faith in this list, at least in the sense that it does not contradict them. Once 
again, we "nd overlaps and family resemblances among our concepts, not a 
clean taxonomy.
Meek claims: “All knowing has as its structure and dynamic the sub-
sidiary-focal integrative feat as identi"ed by Polanyi.”19 If she is right, faith(7) 
is as ubiquitous as “thin” faith. We need it in order to know anything. Does 
faith(7) go beyond “thin” faith? Does our reliance on subsidiary awareness go 
beyond basic epistemic faculties? It seems the answer is yes. Only a trained 
physician can use the probe to extend her knowledge in the right way. For 
the untrained person, the probe is just an awkward piece of machinery.  
On Meek’s view, faith(7), since it is crucial to the whole process of coming 
to know, would seem to be worthy of my focus in this book. Nevertheless, 
my focus is somewhere else. Faith(7) is bound up with Polanyian epistemol-
ogy. #is book doesn’t focus on epistemology, but on morality. I am writing 
about a virtue the possession of which helps one to achieve the goods of 
important human practices: scienti"c research, social and political reform, 
and parenting. I will return to faith(7) in chapter "ve, when I discuss the 
case of Henrietta Leavitt, but for most of this book, our attention will be on 
faith(8).
Faith(8): faith is believing and being for things that are not known and 
are not believed by people who are epistemologically close to us. Two parts 
of this de"nition need immediate comment. First, faith(8) involves believing 
things not known. A few paragraphs back, I noted that modern epistemolo-
gists have worked very hard in the futile (so far) e%ort to "nd a de"nition of 
knowledge they can all a+rm. My de"nition of faith(8) does not depend on 
settling this debate. It doesn’t matter which theory of knowledge you adopt; 
faith(8) only applies to things you do not know—given your theory. We all 
admit that there are many things we believe that we do not know, so there is 
a very wide "eld of applicability for faith(8).
Second, faith(8) involves believing things that other people—people 
who are epistemologically close to us—do not believe. 
18. Ibid., 75.
19. Ibid., 67.
Many people—both in the past and some living today—live at what 
might be called great epistemic distance from us. Such people live or lived 
in cultures with signi"cantly di%erent plausibility structures than ours. For 
example, a medieval European might have believed that the blood of noble 
persons is purer than the blood of commoners. #is belief is so distant from 
a modern, scienti"c, liberal mindset that we can understand it only with 
e%ort. (What did “blood” or “purity” mean in the medieval context? At a 
minimum, “blood” meant more than the 1uid in one’s veins and “purity” 
meant more than something chemical.) #e belief is so implausible to us 
that we do not consider evidence for or against it. So far as we consider the 
matter at all, we reject the medieval belief as a matter of course. Our un-
thinking rejection of the medieval belief is a kind of faith. (But not faith(8)! 
It is somewhat like faith(7).) It is a faith that lies in our shared life. We live 
this way—a form of life that combines beliefs about the physiology of blood, 
the role of DNA in human reproduction, and the equal political worth of 
every person. Of course, we could stop to think carefully about the medieval 
belief, and we would discover that we have strong evidence for our contrary 
beliefs about blood and DNA; to that extent our rejection of the medieval 
belief in noble blood is based on evidence. But what is the evidence for 
our belief in the equal political worth of every person? #omas Je%erson 
thought it was self-evident—which is an admission that he knew of no evi-
dence for it. And yet it is clear that many people in many times and places 
have not thought the equal political worth of all persons is self-evident; in 
fact, the Nazis thought it obviously false. Belief in the equal political worth 
of all persons is a kind of faith. It is somewhat like Jay Wood’s “thin” faith, in 
that it is unquestioned bedrock of the way we (some of us, anyway) live. But 
belief in the equal political worth of persons doesn’t really "t the thin faith 
category, since the Nazis proved one can do intellectual work while denying 
it. As I said earlier, this list—faiths 1–8—is not complete.
#e point of the illustration is that some people live or lived at great 
epistemic distance from us. #e distance between such widely divergent 
belief systems serves to insulate us from them. For instance, I believe that 
airliners 1y because the air passing over their specially designed curved 
wings creates li$. #is is a rational belief for me, not because I am an expert 
in aircra$ design, but because I remember learning about this in school. A 
great many of our rational beliefs are like that; we learn them from relevant 
authorities who, if called upon, can explain the evidence for the beliefs. 
Now, I think it is safe to say that no medieval Europeans (except da Vinci?) 
had any beliefs about the shape of airplane wings and li$. Perhaps it is not 
quite right to say they didn’t believe what I believe, since the idea never oc-
curred to them. It would seem strange to say the medieval Europeans had a 
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“faith” concerning the shape of airplane wings if they had no beliefs about 
the matter. #erefore, when I suggest that faith involves believing things 
other people don’t believe, in the usual case I mean people whose epistemic 
world is relatively close to mine. 
Experientially, it is not the beliefs of “distant” persons that trouble us. 
I can read a book and learn that Samurai culture included certain beliefs. It 
is an intellectual exercise only; I am not tempted to adopt Samurai beliefs. 
In contrast, suppose I read an editorial in a newspaper or on a website that 
supports capital punishment, while I myself oppose capital punishment. 
#e writer gives reasons for the policy he supports, and in the process he 
expresses a number of beliefs. Now I am challenged. Here is someone who 
inhabits an epistemic world very close to mine and yet we do not agree. 
Why does the writer believe the things he does? Should I, perhaps, adopt 
his beliefs?
I suggest that faith—faith as a virtue, a component of good living—
most o$en occurs in such settings. Faith involves believing things that are 
not believed by people who are epistemologically close to me. In fact, they 
are people for whom I have intellectual respect: I regard them as well in-
formed and rational.20 Yet they believe di%erently than I do. My knowledge 
that a well-informed and rational person does not believe as I do almost 
always gives me grounds for doubting whether what I believe is true. If 
nothing else, I can think of that person as giving well-informed and ratio-
nal testimony against my belief. If I nevertheless believe that it is true, my 
believing is usually faith.21 In chapter three I will argue that such believing 
is part of good living.
If a philosopher I respect says there is no God, I have reason to doubt 
there is a God. If I continue to believe in God, it will be because I think 
that if all the relevant evidence were on the table it would demonstrate the 
existence of God. But of course, in regard to belief in God—and in regard 
20. Someone might object that if a well-informed and rational person believes 
a thing then all well-informed and rational people ought to believe it. #is mistakes 
“well-informed and rational” for “omniscient and perfectly wise.” I will return to the 
question of what we ought to believe in chapter 3.
21. Something like the following could happen. I could recognize that someone 
else, for whom I have intellectual respect, believes p while I believe ~p. #is causes me 
to reexamine my position. Upon reexamination, I "nd that my belief seems very well 
supported by evidence; I am convinced it is a rational belief. It doesn’t seem right to me 
to call my belief faith, since it is in accord with reason. And yet, the other person, whom 
I respect, does not agree. I am at a loss as to what to think about the other person’s 
belief. And he may be just as dismayed by my belief. Neither of us regards his position 
as “faith,” since he thinks it is in accord with reason.
to many important other questions in life—we live our lives without all the 
relevant evidence.
#is is where faith(8) lives. We are fully aware of people whom we 
respect—intelligent, well-informed, and well-intentioned people—who 
do not believe some of the things we believe. Nevertheless we continue to 
believe those things. I contend that faith(8) occurs commonly. It is a faith 
that coexists with doubt in the typical case. Note the explicit contrast with 
faith(2), which pictures faith and doubt as inversely proportional.
Faith(8) includes both "des and "ducia. It is not enough to believe 
something is true; one must also be “for” it. #is is such an important point 
that I will devote section 2.2 to it.
I claim—and this is the most important assertion of this section—that 
faith(8) describes the attitude many people hold toward many beliefs; faith(8) 
has many instances in real life. In chapter three I will argue that faith(8) is a 
virtue. 
2.2 BEING FOR: THE AFFECTIVE AND VOLITIONAL 
COMPONENTS OF FAITH
In this section, I adopt, nearly wholesale, Robert Adams’ position that faith 
includes a%ective and volitional components. In chapter 16, “Moral Faith,” 
from Finite and In"nite Goods (1999), Adams says that merely believing a 
thing is not su+cient for faith: “To have faith is always to be for what one 
has faith in.”22 In 2006 he published A !eory of Virtue, in which Adams 
explained his broad notion of being for something, in a passage I cited in 
chapter one. 
#ere are many ways of being for something. #ey include: lov-
ing it, liking it, respecting it, wanting it, wishing for it, appreciat-
ing it, thinking highly of it, speaking in favor of it and otherwise 
intentionally standing for it symbolically, acting to promote or 
protect it, and being disposed to do such things.23
Suppose some person, Elaine, believes that a hurricane will strike her 
coastal county within 48 hours. Elaine’s belief is not irrational; a$er all, 
hurricanes do occur, her county does border the ocean, and it is hurricane 
season. Let us assume that her belief is not shared by all Elaine’s neighbors. 
Perhaps the weather service has predicted the hurricane might come ashore 
somewhere else or not strike land at all. #e mere fact that reasonable people 
22. Adams, Finite and In"nite Goods, 384.
23. Adams, A !eory of Virtue, 15–16.
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around her do not believe the hurricane will strike their county ought to 
give Elaine some cause to doubt her belief. Nevertheless, Elaine does believe 
that the hurricane will strike and will devastate the county.
We are not now focusing on whether Elaine’s belief is well-grounded, 
rational, or right. As we will see in the next chapter, some philosophers have 
said that Elaine ought to strictly regulate her degree of belief to the amount 
of evidence she has for the belief. We will leave that question for chapter 
three. #e point I am focusing on now is this: Elaine’s belief about the hur-
ricane is not faith, because she is not for it. In fact, Elaine feels a mixture of 
despair and dread whenever she thinks about the hurricane. She is against 
the hurricane, though she "nds it very hard to express her opposition to it. 
Taking precautions before the hurricane strikes and cooperating in recon-
struction e%orts a$erward seem terribly inadequate as means of expressing 
her opposition to the hurricane. Such practical actions may help limit or al-
leviate the bad e%ects of the storm, but in regard to the storm itself they are 
symbolic actions.24 We might say that Elaine’s attitude toward the hurricane 
is that it ought not to be.25
#is feature of faith, that it includes our a%ections and volitions, is 
a long-standing part of religious tradition. “You believe that there is one 
God? Good! Even the demons believe that—and shudder” (James 2:19, New 
International Version). #e demons, according to this text, are against God 
in much the same way as Elaine is against the hurricane. #e apostle takes it 
for granted that the demons do not have real faith. If faith is to be a virtue, it 
must include more than intellectual assent, says James: “faith without deeds 
is dead.” (James 2:17, 26)
Adams’ notion of being for something includes feelings, attitudes, de-
sires, and hopes in regard to it, as well as symbolic actions favoring it and 
actions that promote or protect it. #us he includes both our a%ections and 
our volitions in the notion of being for. #at sounds right to me, and it steers 
us away from unnecessary complications.
We might be tempted to ask precisely which a%ections or volitions 
are required to transform belief into faith. Suppose a college soccer player 
believes his team will win the conference championship. He rejoices at the 
thought; he is excited by the prospect of a championship; and he con"dently 
predicts to his friends that the team will win the conference. Nevertheless, 
he exhibits poor practice habits: he arrives late, doesn’t work hard, and 
24. See Adams, Finite and In"nite Goods, 214–249, for a discussion of symbols and 
the ways we use them to express ourselves as being for the good (or against the bad).
25. See Neiman, Evil in Modern !ought, 5. Neiman identi"es as basic to our judg-
ment that something is evil the thought: this ought not to have happened; it ought not 
to be.
distracts his teammates with irrelevant conversation. My goal is to imagine 
a case in which the player’s a%ections seem right but his volitions are wrong. 
Should we say he has faith that his team will win the championship? “Faith 
without deeds is dead,” says the apostle, and we can imagine the player’s 
coach would agree. In this case it seems that belief plus a%ect is not enough; 
real faith should show itself in the player’s behavior. But not all examples 
are like the soccer player. Imagine a fan of the same college soccer team 
who believes, not that the team will win the conference, but that the coach 
is an excellent coach: knowledgeable, hard working, dedicated, and so on. 
His belief gives the fan con"dence that the coach is doing the right thing 
when, for example, he hears other people criticize the coach’s strategy or 
substitutions during a game. He rejoices at successes by the team, and he 
thinks the coach deserves partial credit for those successes. It is completely 
possible that the fan’s belief and con"dence in the coach produce no observ-
able actions on the part of the fan. Perhaps he doesn’t even verbally defend 
the coach when he hears others criticize him. #e fan simply attends games 
and feels a sense of satisfaction and approval in watching good coaching. I 
think we should say that the fan has faith in the coach; in this case belief plus 
a%ect seems enough.
I may not have imagined or described these examples just right. Some-
one might say that the soccer player does have faith that his team will win 
the conference, but that he lacks other virtues, such as self-control and the 
determination to work hard. I think the point of the examples still stands, 
however: the proper a%ect/volition that combines with belief to constitute 
faith may vary in di%erent cases.
What about the person whose religious faith is combined with anger 
at God? Suppose a long time religious believer experiences great evil in 
the world—his family is destroyed in ethnic cleansing, or he is betrayed 
by a trusted friend, or he is diagnosed with a terminal and painful disease. 
Understandably, many persons of faith have reported feeling great anger at 
God in these sorts of situations. Should we say that these people are against 
God? Surely being angry at something can be one way of being against it. 
Should we therefore say that these people do not have faith in God, at least 
while their anger lasts?
In most cases, I think such a person is an example of what Adams calls 
“clinging to faith.”26 #e believer believes that God exists and is kind and 
just; yet in his su%ering he does not experience God’s kindness or justice. 
#e anger the believer feels toward God arises from this contradiction. We 
might say the believer is for the God he believes in but against the God he 
26. Adams, Finite and In"nite Goods, 386.
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experiences. Eventually believers resolve this tension, either by rationalizing 
their experience in a way that allows them to incorporate it into their beliefs 
about God, by abandoning belief in God, or by gradually losing their anger. 
(#eoretically, one could retain one’s belief in God and settle into a deter-
mined opposition to God, a la James’s devils. But I don’t know of any such 
accounts.) #e faithful are sometimes angry at God, but such anger does not 
last forever; if it did, they would cease to be faithful.
I agree with Adams that faith involves being for the thing believed, 
but that leaves open the way that one is for the thing believed. Most of the 
time, we might guess, faith will involve both a%ect (feelings, desires, etc.) 
and volition (decisions and actions). But we don’t need to try to make a rule 
that tells us how much of either is required—cases will di%er.
A more important question is not how much a%ect or volition is re-
quired for faith, but whether a%ect and volition together simply are faith. 
Does faith really need belief? We turn to that question next.
2.3 WHY FAITH MUST INCLUDE BELIEF
As we will see in chapter 3, some philosophers have thought that all our be-
lieving ought to be strictly governed by evidence. #ey would say that faith, 
if it involves believing something more strongly than the evidence indicates, 
is a bad thing. At the same time, such thinkers might agree that a good life 
sometimes includes feelings and decisions that involve us in risk. So they 
might say that “faith” could be a good thing (in some circumstances), but 
only as a combination of a%ect and volition. We don’t need to believe beyond 
the evidence, they would say, in order to feel and act beyond the evidence.
Such objectors might o%er an example along these lines. Suppose there 
is discord in a marriage over money. Husband and wife argue over money 
and each occasionally undermines the family budget by making large uni-
lateral spending decisions. #e situation builds to a crisis. #e couple sees 
a counselor, who tries to help them understand why they use purchases 
to “one-up” each other. Both husband and wife seem to understand the 
situation better, and they promise to each other to change their "nancial 
practices.
Now, our objecting philosophers will say, the husband and wife may 
well act on “faith”—understood as each being for the healing of the mar-
riage. #at is, they each want the marriage to succeed; they each love the 
other; each one decides to change his or her behavior. #e husband and wife 
make a commitment to a common project. But in none of this do they be-
lieve anything to any degree beyond what the evidence supports. #ey both 
know that the other has promised to change, and they both can estimate 
how likely it is that the other will change. At "rst they might struggle with 
a lot of doubt, but as time goes on and each one sticks to the new "nancial 
discipline, both wife and husband come to believe more "rmly in the other’s 
repentance.
If “faith” is to be a virtue, the objectors could argue, isn’t that the way 
we should understand it? Conceived this way, faith is a combination of a%ect 
and volition, but it doesn’t require belief.27 Consistent with what we said 
in chapter one, the objectors could point out that this “faith” interweaves 
with other virtues, such as love and tenacity. But beliefs should always be 
governed by evidence.
I would counter that faith does require belief, even in the marriage 
case just described. Notice, though, that I don’t need to show that faith in-
cludes belief in every case. #e burden of proof goes the other way. #e 
objector wants to de"ne faith as only a%ect and/or volition, not belief that 
goes beyond the evidence. If faith, conceived as something that contrib-
utes to good living, requires belief in some cases but not others, that is still 
enough to show that good living sometimes requires a faith with a cognitive 
component.
I will say two things to support the idea that faith requires belief in 
at least some cases. First, I will relate an example to illustrate a comment 
by Adams. Suppose that “John” and “Henry” correspond frequently by 
email. #ey live on di%erent continents and have never seen one another. 
Henry has a position of mid-level authority in the government of a small 
developing country. Henry has steadfastly refused to participate in bribery 
and other corruptions that infest the ministry where he works, and this 
has drawn him into increasing con1ict with ambitious coworkers. Some of 
these people threaten Henry. #ey demand that he collaborate with some 
of their dishonest schemes, or else they will destroy his career with false 
accusations. 
Henry asks John for his advice. John quickly learns that Henry has 
good reason to believe Henry’s enemies have the power to carry through on 
their threats. #e ministry and the local courts are fairly rife with corrup-
tion. #e whole episode causes John to feel thankful for the comparatively 
honest courts and civil service in his own country, but he realizes that he 
cannot apply his expectations of government in his country to government 
in Henry’s country. Now, how should John advise Henry? Should he en-
courage him to persist in his rejection of bribery and his pursuit of e+cient, 
27. Louis Pojman takes this position. See Pojman, “Faith, Hope and Doubt.” 
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honest public service? Or should he tell Henry to act in ways Henry has 
already described as corrupt?
Adams says:
Morality requires that we encourage each other to live morally. 
But how could we do that in good conscience if we thought 
living morally would be bad for the other person? Are we to 
encourage others to act morally so that we, or the less scrupu-
lous, may take advantage of them, or so that we may all lose 
out together? #ose are not morally attractive propositions; but 
if, on the other hand, we cease to encourage each other to act 
morally, we have abandoned morality as a social enterprise. So 
it seems that if we do not believe that living morally is at least 
normally good for a person, there will be a con1ict in the very 
soul of our morality that threatens to tear it apart.28
Does John believe that moral living is good for Henry? Perhaps it 
would be a good thing for Henry if he were to succeed in leading an anti-
corruption campaign. But John has no expectation that such a campaign 
would succeed. If Henry persists in his honesty, John expects it will cost 
Henry his career and possibly much more. 
We can easily imagine, or "nd in history books, cases which paral-
lel the John and Henry case. Should the “Johns” in these stories advise the 
“Henrys” to risk great loss (martyrdom, in many actual cases) for what is 
morally right? Adams’ point is this: morality requires that we do so, and yet 
morality requires that we not do so, unless we believe that acting morally is 
at least normally good for the moral person. It is not enough that we wish 
or desire that moral living be good for our friends; we need to actually think 
that it is good for them. And yet it seems easy to "nd rational and well in-
formed people who deny that such moral living really is good for the moral 
person. Friedrich Nietzsche comes to mind. Nietzsche famously scorned 
the “slave morality” of inferior people that threatened the full living of better 
people. He emphatically denied that “noble” people should curb their lives 
according to slave morality.29
#e objector may try to argue this way. “We only need to believe that 
acting morally is good for the person to the extent that evidence seems to 
suggest that it really will be good for the person. Our beliefs can be regu-
lated by evidence, while our moral faith consists in our emotions and deci-
sions.” But this will not work. Adams is right that morality requires us (at 
least sometimes) to encourage our friends to act morally even when the cost 
28. Adams, Finite and In"nite Goods, 377.
29. Nietzsche, !e Genealogy of Morals, section 10.
to them is high, and we cannot in good conscience do so if we think that it 
would be bad for them, all things considered.
Let’s move away now from the example. #e second thing I want to say 
to defend the cognitive component of faith is simply an observation about 
human psychology. To wit: for human beings, believing, desiring, and will-
ing are interrelated. For more than one hundred years, since Freud at least, 
psychologists have been saying that our believings, desirings, and willings 
are interrelated subconsciously; we are never fully aware of how they in1u-
ence each other.
Now if this picture of the human mind is at all accurate—that there 
is a subconscious mind and that our beliefs, desires, and decisions interact 
with each other—it seems highly unlikely that the virtue of faith could exist 
purely as a combination of desire and decision. #e cognitive component 
of faith will get dragged in because of its in1uence on a%ect and volition. 
To illustrate the point, let us imagine another player on the college soccer 
team, this time one who has excellent practice habits. #is player wants his 
team to win the conference championship and he behaves in ways that help 
make him a better player and his team a better team. But since he believes 
that several other teams in the conference are superior to his, he rejects out 
of hand the notion that his team will win the conference. He simply doesn’t 
believe it. And for that reason, it’s wrong to say he has faith that the team 
will win the conference. He has the right a%ect and volition, but without the 
appropriate belief, he doesn’t have that faith.
It will be instructive to pursue the example a bit further. If the player 
doesn’t believe the team will win the conference, why does he persist in 
his excellent practice habits? What sustains him in the face of di+culty, 
discomfort, disappointment, and lazy teammates? Most likely, the player 
believes in something—not that the team will win the conference, but that 
something valuable can be gained by striving for excellence in soccer. #e 
player does have a faith of some sort, and it involves belief, even if the player 
could not clearly express that belief. 
2.4 SUMMARY DEFINITION
Faith(8): believing and being for something that is doubtful (in the normal 
case, something not believed by persons for whom one has intellectual 
respect). Believing something involves thinking that it is true. “Being for” 
something involves a%ect and volition.
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2.5 ADDENDUM: REGARDING “PROPOSITIONS”
Some readers of the book to this point, particularly those trained in phi-
losophy, will have noticed that I have avoided using the word “proposition,” 
except when quoting someone else. I have employed “thing” or “something,” 
as in “Faith is believing something.” Some may think I have perversely used 
a vague word when a more precise word is available. So I should explain.
First of all, there is a di%erence between the words we use to describe 
something and the thing itself. A Christian has faith in God. She uses many 
words (e.g. “I believe in God the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and 
earth, etc.”) to describe God. Her faith is not in those words, but in the 
reality to which they point. It is quite proper, even necessary, for Christians 
to use propositions to describe God. How else could they do many of the 
things essential to their religion, such as public worship, religious instruc-
tion of children, and so on? Nevertheless, the Christian may come to be dis-
satis"ed with some proposition or group of propositions she has previously 
employed. (Maybe for the "rst time in her life she has encountered horri"c 
evil; her previous attempts at theodicy now sound empty and weak to her.) 
#e Christian may well come to deny some of the propositions she formerly 
used to describe her belief in God, and yet rightly insist that she still believes 
in God. In fact, she may say that her belief in God—the real God, not just 
the object of her creed—is stronger than ever.
It should be clear that nothing hangs on the religious nature of the 
previous example. A scientist may have faith in a research program and 
yet be willing to modify many of the auxiliary hypotheses that compose 
the program. A parent may have faith in something for which she "nds no 
adequate proposition at all. Much like the second soccer player, she believes 
that there is something good, something worthwhile, to be achieved by 
means of the struggle in which she is engaged, but she may not be able tell 
you what that good is.
Second, I have been wary of saying that faith means believing a propo-
sition because the phrase sounded, at least to my ear, exclusively cognitive. 
I very much want to guard against the idea that faith is entirely or mostly 
belief that. Faith must include being for the thing believed. #e cognitive 
component is necessary, as I argued in section 2.3, but so are the a%ective 
and volitional components.
#ese two worries compound each other. “#e hurricane will strike 
our county” is simply a proposition. Elaine believes it. But when we say that 
Elaine is against the hurricane, it is the reality we describe with those words 
that she detests, not a mere statement.
Having o%ered these words of explanation, I will now abandon my 
resistance to using “proposition.” I only beg the reader to remember that if 
I speak of faith in a proposition, I mean faith in the thing the proposition is 
used to express, and being for that thing.
